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Afualo, Valeen and John McMillan. 1996. “Auctions of Rights to Public Property,” Working Paper, Stanford University.

Ausubel, Lawrence M. 1999. “Computer Implemented Methods and Apparatus for Auctions,” U.S. Patent Number 5,905,975, issued 18 May 1999.

Ausubel, Lawrence M. 2000. “Computer Implemented Methods and Apparatus for Auctions,” U.S. Patent Number 6,021,398, issued 1 Feb 2000, this file only contains the pages that differ from the 5,905,975 patent.

Ausubel, Lawrence M. 2000. “System and Method for an Efficient Dynamic Auction for Multiple Objects,” U.S. Patent Number 6,026,383, issued 15 Feb 2000.

Ausubel, Lawrence M.. 1997. “An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects,” Working Paper, University of Maryland.

Ausubel, Lawrence M. and Peter Cramton. 1998. “Auctioning Securities,” Working Paper, University of Maryland.

Ausubel, Lawrence M. and Peter Cramton. 1999. “The Optimality of Being Efficient,” Working Paper, University of Maryland. [Presentation]

Ausubel, Lawrence M. and Peter Cramton. 1999. “Vickrey Auctions with Reserve Pricing,” Working Paper, University of Maryland.

Ausubel, Lawrence M. and Peter Cramton. 1996. “Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions,” Working Paper, University of Maryland. [Presentation]

Ausubel, Lawrence M. and Jesse A. Schwartz. 1998. “The Ascending Auction Paradox,” Working Paper, University of Maryland.

Bulow, Jeremy, Ming Huang, and Paul Klemperer. 1996. “Toeholds and Takeovers,” Working Paper, Stanford University.

Bulow, Jeremy and Paul Klemperer. 1998. “Prices and The Winner's Curse,” Working Paper, Stanford University.

Bulow, Jeremy and Paul Klemperer. 1999. “The Generalized War of Attrition,” American Economic Review, 89, 175-189.

Cramton, Peter. 1998. “Ascending Auctions,” European Economic Review, 42, 745-756.

Cramton, Peter. 1998. “Auctions and Takeovers,” Peter Newman (ed.), New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, London: MacMillan Press.

Cramton, Peter, Robert Gibbons, and Paul Klemperer. 1987. “Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently,” Econometrica, 55, 615-632.

Cramton, Peter and Suzi Kerr. 1998. “Tradeable Carbon Permit Auctions: How and Why to Auction Not Grandfather,” Working Paper, University of Maryland.

Cramton, Peter and Suzi Kerr. 1999. “The Distributional Effects of Carbon Regulation: Why auctioned carbon permits are attractive and feasible,” in Thomas Sterner (ed.) The Market and the Environment Cheltenham, United Kingdom: Edward Elgar, chapter 12.

Cramton, Peter and Alan Schwartz. 1991. “Using Auction Theory to Inform Takeover Regulation,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 7, 27-53.

McAfee, R. Preston. 1998. “Four Issues in Auction and Market Design,” Working Paper, University of Texas.

McAfee, R. Preston and John McMillan. 1998. “Game Theory and Competition,” Working Paper, University of Texas.

Milgrom, Paul. 2000. “Putting Auction Theory to Work: The Simultaneous Ascending Auction,” Journal of Political Economy, 108, forthcoming.

Milgrom, Paul. 2004. Putting Auction Theory to Work, Cambridge University Press.

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